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Debtscape    




This article reveals the central role played by the Australian constitution in producing the Australian 
debtscape through the establishment and maintenance of a colonial nomopoly. Australia’s colonial 
law is foundationally premised upon violent acts of invasion of Indigenous land and water, and 
because this continues without consent, the colonial state uses its monopoly of violence to 
manufacture consent through law for two main reasons: the first is to generate retrospective 
exculpation for historical wrongs and economic theft (the debtscape) and the second is to establish 
consent frameworks to provide cover for future exploitation and theft (the colonial nomopoly). 
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Colonial Nomopoly and Sovereign Debtscape 
This article is concerned with the Australian constitution (the Constitution) and 
in revealing the structure it provides for exploitative coloniality to persist in the 
present. While the Constitution has been critiqued on racial grounds and 
Constitutional recognition for Indigenous people has been on the political 
agenda formally since 2012,1 insufficient attention has been paid to its 
structural meaning/function in relation to the ‘racial’ problem the Recognise 
campaign has sought to redress. Here, critical attention to the structural role of 
the Constitution reveals its status as colonial nomopoly. This term is coined to 
make visible the way that the Constitution occupies the position of singular legal 
authority by effacing its foundationally violent origins and by imposing a 
framework that seeks to eliminate competition for law. 
A nomopoly denotes a monopoly in the creation of nomos/law (Macdonald & 
Sandomierski 2006) but in a colonial context it has the added feature of 
structurally foreclosing the operations of the first laws of Aboriginal peoples by 
subjecting all to its rule. The absence of a legitimate basis for this subjectification 
or ‘throwing under’ (Macdonald & Sandomierski 2006) is what gives rise to 
the need for continual policy moves seeking to absolve the colonial legal 
apparatus for lacking consent to rule. The Australian Constitution as a key 
exemplar of the colonial nomopoly plays a critical role in retrospective 
exculpation for historical and ongoing state violence and economic theft. It also 
works to produce the legal borders against which targeted populations 
experience state violence. The nomopoly then is a critical component of the 





is disavowed through consent frameworks (colonial laws), which provide 
license for the colonial state to obfuscate existing evidence of its violent 
practices and to continue with exploitation and theft. 
A Note on Language  
This article critiques colonial Australian law by introducing new theoretical 
concepts necessary for the critical unpacking of law and its colonial function. 
Because nomophilia, the inability to see law as anything other than the remedy 
for social issues (Giannacopoulos 2011; Giannacopoulos 2020) pervades so 
much legal and academic thinking there is an urgent need for a new lexicon to 
resist and challenge the exploitative coloniality of Australian law. Critical 
approaches to the Constitution reveal the racial and economic ordering 
functions that it performs. This is increasingly important for two main reasons. 
The first relates to the fact that constitutional ‘reformist’ positions continue to 
dominate the Australian national debate, academic legal commentary and 
legal pedagogy, despite the fact that it is structurally illogical that colonial law 
could ever deliver decolonial justice. And the second is that a critical legal 
lexicon reveals the link between constitutional boundaries and state violence 
occurring at the so-called national/geographic borders of the colonial state. 
The Deathscapes project provides an evidentiary ground for showing how 
settler colonial states systematically violate targeted populations, Indigenous, 
refugee and economically disenfranchised peoples, at and with the borders 
generated through the work of the colonial nomopoly.  
State Violence Archive: Deathscapes2 
Deathscapes is an international project with the aim of mapping race and 
violence in the colonial settler states of Australia, the US, Canada and the UK. 
The evidentiary aspect of the Deathscapes project is found in the meticulously 
researched case studies providing concrete proof of state violence as the lived 
effect of colonial governance in settler colonial contexts. The project which 
generates a single site in which otherwise silenced voices, artworks and 
testimonies relating to the lives of people targeted by state violence are 
collected and interconnected, has the simply stated yet ambitious objective of 
ending deaths in custody. It is an analytical archive, organised around key case 
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studies which foreground the culpability of the state in countless deaths and 
where global imperial forces are revealed. The focus of this article is not to 
discuss the content of Deathscapes at length but to suggest that the significance 
of the existing case studies lies in their ability to provide analytical frameworks 
to understand unfolding violence. The recent fatal killing by police of Warlpiri 
man Kumanjayi Walker while at home and on his own country at Yuendumu in 
the Northern Territory3 can be read against at least two of the Deathscapes 
case studies. Through case study titled The Road: Passage through the 
Deathscape4 we learn of the life and death of Mr Ward a senior 
Ngaanyatjarra lore man and artist, aged 46, who died in the back of a prison 
van while being transported across the Western Desert on 27 January 2008 
following his arrest for drink driving. Following his death, the Coroner said that 
Mr Ward had not only suffered a terrible death but that it was avoidable. The 
fact that the state official found Mr Ward’s death to be avoidable speaks 
directly to the profound absence of a duty of care towards him.  
Read in isolation, this police killing may seem exceptional, but Deathscapes 
does not allow for this simplistic reading. At a Lethal Intersection: The Killing of 
Ms Dhu5 tells the story of Ms Dhu, a 22-year-old woman of the Yamatji-Nanda 
Nation and the Banjima People, who was taken into custody at the South 
Hedland police lock-up under a warrant of commitment for unpaid fines. She 
died within 44 hours of entering the custody of Western Australian police. 
Because the project connects crucial dots around the workings of colonial 
power, it offers a holistic way of understanding contemporary violence, in this 
case police violence, while also building a body of evidence of that violence 
through artwork, testimony, film and poetry. As Jordy Silverstein has observed, 
Deathscapes affirms that ‘deaths in custody of racialised people … are not an 
accident. They are by design. They are a feature, not a bug, of the system’ 
(2019). All three deaths of Mr Ward, Ms Dhu and that of Kumanjayi Walker 
might be seen as avoidable, to borrow the words of the Coroner but they are 
also the logical outcome of a system constitutionally built to eliminate 
Indigenous peoples and their laws.  
With other digital archive projects identifying that state harm or crime are on 
the rise, I suggest that Deathscapes stands apart in its global and scholarly 





innovative academic research to transform understandings of irregular 
migration and border control. The Killing Times project is an updatable, 
interactive map showing evidence of mass killings from 1788 until 1928, which 
is described as a sustained and systematic process of conflict and expansion.7 
The Deaths Inside Project, from 2019 tracks all Indigenous deaths in custody in 
Australia and monitors systemic issues like the provision of appropriate medical 
care.8 While the above projects have an exclusive focus on single issues such 
as irregular migration, historical killings of Indigenous peoples or on the 
counting of deaths, the Deathscapes project is conceptually expansive and 
politically daring: the unifying purpose and analytical approach is about social 
agitation and action to end state violence. Because Deathscapes does not have 
a single focus or limiting borders around the state actions and violations that 
come under its purview and critique, it pioneers an original borderless 
approach to the study of state violence. It does this by deliberately moving 
‘away from the nation as the primary analytical unit to consider forms of 
governance and social relations that are transnationally linked’. In taking a 
‘cross-disciplinary approach to racialized state violence’ the site maps 
‘racialized deaths in custody in all their visual, analytical and geographical 
dimensions’.9 Methodologically, intellectually and politically, the approach 
taken by Deathscapes is one of open borders. Unlike its peers, the project does 
not carefully delineate boundaries beyond which critique, and analysis of state 
violence cannot extend. Deathscapes works against the silencing practices that 
accompany state violence and it does this by adopting and modelling a 
powerful genealogical method that is attentive to local detail within a global 
context where intellectual and political solidarity is urgently needed.  
A History of the Present and Borderless Methodologies and 
Pedagogies  
Chief Investigators of the Deathscapes project, Suvendrini Perera and Joseph 
Pugliese, have for nearly three decades produced a body of critical intellectual 
work on race that uniquely positions them to direct this groundbreaking project 
that is engendering profound new forms of scholarly activism. The project 
funded primarily by the Australian Research Council is built inclusively to effect 
social change on the most pressing questions of injustice. It constitutes a racial 
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‘history of the present’ and as such provides resources and a model for 
scholarly and political activism. As David Garland has observed, a history of 
the present ‘sounds paradoxical at first’ (2014, p. 367). But this Foucauldian 
methodology that ‘explicitly and self-consciously begins with a diagnosis of the 
current situation’ and has an ‘unabashed contemporary orientation’ (Garland 
2014, p. 367) is precisely the genealogical approach of Deathscapes. The site 
reveals through the voices and artefacts of those targeted by violent power ‘a 
series of troublesome associations and lineages’ in order to trace how 
contemporary practices of state violence emerged out of ‘specific struggles, 
conflicts, alliances, and exercises of power, many of which are nowadays 
forgotten’ (Garland 2014, p. 372). This method offers a way of writing critical 
race history by using historical materials to assess and understand the modern 
day and indeed to ‘problematize the present’ (Garland 2014, p. 372). 
Deathscapes is genealogical because it allows otherwise silenced voices to 
speak to power struggles and attempts at domination to show how colonial 
power has taken its contemporary form. There can be no question that the 
burden assumed by Deathscapes in generating a body of evidence of global 
state violence is a form of writing history in the present by engaging boldly with 
‘forces active in the present’ within ‘a field of power relations and political 
struggle’ (Garland 2014, p. 373). Because of this approach, Deathscapes has 
a profound pedagogical function. 
As an academic working with and between the disciplines of law, sociolegal 
studies and criminology and with undergraduate training in English literature, 
law and with a PhD in Cultural Studies, I have experienced the gatekeeping 
function of academic and pedagogical borders throughout my career. While 
universities ostensibly welcome interdisciplinarity, in reality this happens 
alongside the powerful policing of disciplinary boundaries. I teach criminology 
without being a criminologist, but this is not unusual in the neoliberal university. 
I teach courses that are conducted from within the auspices of the colonial 
discipline of criminology (Agozino 2004; Cunneen and Tauri 2019, p. 359) 
and which examine the ways in which some populations are targeted for 
punishment in the absence of having committed any crime. Or, where crime 
has been committed, crime is defined and policed in a way that embeds a 





that posit an individual as the perpetrator of crime against another individual 
and/or symbolically against society. The idea that crime or wrongdoing against 
populations can also be perpetrated by those in power charged with the 
responsibility for the protection of peoples is disruptive to the core ideas holding 
the discipline together. In this approach to crime, the concepts of colonialism, 
race, sovereignty, austerity and illegitimate state power are crucial. There is a 
focus on the punishment of Indigenous populations, the punishment of those 
seeking asylum yet unable to cross state borders and on populations subjected 
to economic austerity regimes. This course requires an evidentiary body to 
draw on as well as a critical vocabulary in order to reveal how the punishment 
of populations is represented as legitimate. Within this context I deploy 
Deathscapes to offer a decolonial approach to the teaching of crime. 
Chatterjee and Maira have identified that ‘imperialism and racial statecraft has 
three fronts: military, cultural and academic’ (2014, p. 7). Their 
‘conceptualization of the imperial university links these fronts of war, for the 
academic battleground is part of the culture wars that emerge in a militarized 
nation, one that is always presumably under threat, externally or internally’ 
(2014, p. 7).  
Deathscapes has been a crucial resource with which to teach effectively against 
the criminological grain into a discipline deeply embedded within practices of 
imperialism. Criminology students are predominantly taught about the various 
arms of the criminal justice system (courts, policing, victimology) and crime is 
portrayed as being the act of an individual against society. When those directly 
and disproportionately impacted by the criminal justice system speak about it, 
their voices are deemed ‘subjective, unscientific, and/or, at best, folk 
epistemology’ by the imperial discipline (Cunneen & Tauri 2019, p. 364). This 
‘ideologically driven dismissal of Indigenous’ and/or embodied knowledge is 
‘a key colonial project within the academy … especially within criminology’ 
(Cunneen & Tauri 2019, p. 364). Deathscapes gives value to otherwise 
discredited knowledge and gives it additional power by placing it within a 
knowledge community. Deathscapes provides a decolonising evidentiary 
ground for revealing the artificial and colonial line that holds between objective 
and subjective knowledge while showing the bloody impact of the colonial 
state’s so called rational and objective legal order. Deathscapes is both archive 
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and methodology with pedagogical and social action applications. In the 
section of the article that follows I move to the law’s role in producing but then 
also attempting to nullify the violence that Deathscapes so comprehensively 
brings to light.  
Colonial Nomopoly or Constitutional Borders  
The recent police killing of Kumanjayi Walker while in his home and on his own 
country continues to bear out the Deathscapes contention: that Indigenous 
peoples continue to die at the hands of the colonial state machinery. Regardless 
of whether the most recent killing in custody is proven to be murder, or found 
to be justified, neither outcome will be sufficient to address the deeper issue at 
the heart of the Australian nation. The violent death of Kumanjayi Walker must 
be understood in relation to other evidence—evidence that the law might deem 
circumstantial, but that is available on the public record tracking lethal policing 
of Indigenous peoples on their own lands. Historically, policing has played and 
continues to play a critical role in dispossession in a way that works to displace 
self-determination as a real option for Aboriginal peoples on their own 
countries. Chris Cunneen has shown how unlike any other group, Indigenous 
peoples were subjected to military-style policing, akin to a state of war by 
paramilitary policing units such as the Mounted Police and Native Police forces. 
This form of policing, according to Cunneen was integral to the expansion of 
the British jurisdiction in Australia and it was influenced in its intensity by the 
degree of Indigenous resistance to the colonial will.  
While dominant criminology would tell us that policing is said to operate by 
consent and through the impartial application of the rule of law, this cannot be 
said to hold true in Australia. Not only were Indigenous people resisting 
colonial governance and not policed by consent but the rule of law itself was 
ritually suspended from operation in the early colonial period. This meant that 
the murder of Indigenous people by specialist police forces or by settlers could 
be and was overlooked (Cunneen 2017, p. 3). So not only is it a feature of 
nomopoly to deny Indigenous law and sovereignty, but also for the coloniser 
to disallow the operation of the colonial where it might bring some measure of 
justice to Indigenous peoples. As Australia awaits the trial of the police officer 





witness reports, forensic data and all other information into evidence. Evidence 
is crucial to establish facts, ascribe guilt or absolve a defendant. But other 
evidence, as captured by Deathscapes for example, already exists and relates 
to the culpability of a colonial system that has resulted in systematic Aboriginal 
death, and not just to the actions of an individual officer. At this juncture it is 
important to reveal in more detail the relevance of the Constitution, as 
nomopoly, to the carcerality and related harm revealed by the Deathscapes 
project.  
Australia, as it is currently legally, politically and economically constituted came 
into being in 1901 following the passing of a British Act of Parliament, the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. This is ‘whiteman’s law’ to 
use the words of Senior Lawman Murray George who said that ‘Aboriginal 
law must sit on top of whiteman’s law, because our law is the law of the land’ 
(Sovereign Union 2013). Alongside this critique sits the position of eminent 
constitutional lawyer George Williams declaring that the Constitution has 
‘withstood political crises and the passage of time to produce a stable 
democracy responsive to and representative of the people. This has been a 
crucial factor in the economic and other successes of the Australian nation’ 
(2000, p. 644). While the Constitution has been critiqued on racial grounds, 
the dominating voices in this space advocate for reform (Williams 2000; Davis 
2017). This leaves decolonial critical scholarship of the Constitution produced 
by Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars (Watson 2012; Watson 2018; 
Giannacopoulos 2015; Giannacopoulos 2018) marginalised. And while it is 
logical that constitutional law as a key area of legal inquiry would not give 
primacy to critical knowledge that may undermine it, this is what gives such 
knowledge a colonising character. The critical insights that seek to name the 
coloniality of law, in this instance the naming of the Constitution as colonial 
nomopoly are also where possibilities for decolonial justice reside.  
Writing in 2000 Williams acknowledged that while the Constitution has 
‘produced stable democratic government’ it ‘has failed Indigenous peoples’ 
(2000, p. 647). Williams is explicit about race and human rights being the 
reason for the ‘critical weakness of the Australian constitutional and legal 
system’ (2000, p. 646). About the drafting, he said:  
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The Australian Constitution was drafted at two conventions held in the 1890s. 
Neither convention included any women, nor representatives of Australia's 
Indigenous peoples and ethnic communities. In most cases, Aboriginal people 
were not qualified to vote for the delegates to the Convention and appear to 
have played no meaningful role in the drafting process itself. It is not surprising, 
then, that the Australian Constitution as drafted did not reflect their interests or 
aspirations. The preamble makes no mention of the prior occupation of Australia 
by its Indigenous peoples. In fact, the operative provisions of the Australian 
Constitution were premised upon their exclusion, and even discrimination against 
them. This, then, was the legal foundation upon which Aboriginal people were 
made part of the Commonwealth of Australia on 1 January 1901 (Williams 
2000, p. 648). 
As important as the critiques that Williams makes are, they are situated as 
historical and are silent on the question of colonialism. His critique outlines the 
centrality of British whiteness in the establishment of the legal structure by 
identifying that the interests of Aboriginal people (and other ethnic peoples) 
were not considered, nor was ‘prior’ occupation mentioned. And while 
Williams’ critiques are historically accurate, these exclusions and omissions are 
in fact logical if the Constitution is seen as a key colonial apparatus. Williams 
is of the view that the Constitution ‘as drafted’ did not reflect the interests of 
Indigenous peoples, even though he said they were affected more than any 
other group (2000, pp. 646-647). The fact that Indigenous peoples were 
affected more than any other group is logically consistent if the Constitution is 
not only placed in a historical context but also understood within the context of 
colonisation. By coming into being, the Constitution erased what came before; 
prior Indigenous occupation, laws and sovereignties. It assumed the position of 
nomopoly. This is downplayed by the trick played by the constitutional reformist 
position. While the critique is a strong one, the belief in the Constitution itself 
underwrites and informs the critique. Central to Williams’ argument then is 
nomophilia (Giannacopoulos 2011; Giannacopoulos 2020). His critique 
exhibits an uncritical love for colonial law since he is confident that if the 
Constitution had been drafted differently with the interests of Indigenous 
peoples considered, the result would be less racist. He goes further to state that:  
There is no constitutional reason why a treaty could not recognise a measure of 





within the existing legal system. The Australian Federation already encompasses 
different laws co-existing at the federal, state, and local levels. The High Court in 
Mabo (No 2) has also given legal effect to the native title of Indigenous peoples 
and has found that the content of this title is defined by Indigenous legal and 
cultural traditions. This did not fracture Australia's existing system of law, but was 
accommodated within it (Williams 2000, p. 664). 
This type of critique does not acknowledge the pivotal role played by law as 
part of a colonial structure. And so, it produces and is symptomatic of 
nomophilia and remains the prevailing form of the constitutional critique 
informing state approaches to questions of Indigenous justice.  
While the colonial undertaking began well before 1900, the Constitution 
generated an artificial yet materially violent origin point that sought to 
nomopolise what could constitute law in the newly founded ‘Australia’ by 
replacing ‘an entire system of ownership with another’ (Wolfe 2016, p. 34). 
But this violence was not able to do away with Indigenous peoples, their 
resistance and their laws. This gave rise to the need to impose a structure that 
could continually act on the desire to eliminate. Wolfe asserted that ‘settler 
societies seek to neutralise the extraneous sovereignties that conquered Natives 
continue to instantiate’ (2016, pp. 35-36). The state deals with this structural 
tension in several ways, including by seeking ‘consent to transfer of ownership’ 
(2016, p. 36) even after they have nomopolised the land.  
There should be no doubt that the Australian High Court ruling in Mabo v 
Queensland (Mabo)10 entrenched the colonial legal borders of Australian law 
and power. But this is not the prevailing view. The more popular meaning is 
that the ruling did what it said it did and that was to reject ‘terra nullius as a 
legitimate source of legal foundation’ (Watson 2002). And while the decision 
has been widely celebrated as advancing the place of Indigenous peoples 
under Australian law, these are politically naïve conclusions about Mabo that 
are productive of nomophilia.   The formal rejection of the doctrine of terra 
nullius, more than 200 years after colonisation has in fact entrenched its 
sovereignty according to Watson (2002). Although the High Court, a key 
institution in Australia’s constitutional infrastructure, identified the foundational 
logic for Australian law as fictitious, the violence done in the name of that fiction 
was left untouched by ruling that the sovereignty upon which the law was based 
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was non-justiciable (Watson 2002). In other words, the colonial court produced 
by colonial sovereignty ruled that justice could not be done to the question of 
sovereignty (Giannacopoulos 2006, p. 45). The ruling was that the law could 
not trump sovereignty even if the location of the court was in that same moment 
being used to affirm colonial sovereignty and to create the conditions for its 
future. The Mabo decision as legal ‘event’ has operated to cement 
foundationally violent legal borders, structures of invasion, while acting as 
masquerade for justice for Indigenous peoples. This is nomophilic and fictitious.  
Despite the formal overturning of terra nullius, the Australian legal system is still 
‘imposed’ and locked in place to ‘deny pre-existing Aboriginal laws that have 
lived in this land from the beginning’ (Watson 2002, p. 3). The effect of this 
imposition is that despite and perhaps because of moments of self-consciousness 
about its racial constitution, the legal system still operates to ‘subjugate Nungas 
to the power of the colonial state. Australia is a place taken without the consent 
of the ‘natives’—with no treaty or agreements ever signed—where terra 
nullius filled a lawless void, is now hungry to construe our consent to the theft 
of our lands and the genocide of our peoples’ (Watson 2002, p. 3). Despite 
Watson’s incisive and prolific critique of the terra nullius overturning being the 
trick of the Mabo decision, the official story became and remains that 
Australia’s legal system has since 1992 been humanely redressing its racial 
history.  
While the High Court of Australia ‘did reject terra nullius it was also highly 
concerned with the legitimacy of ‘Australia’ as a settled colony’ (Watson 2014, 
p. 510). Out of that strategic rejection, or one that I name an exculpatory 
event, colonial power entrenched itself further by ‘having one’s cake and 
eating it; that is the Mabo decision enjoyed a lime-lighted victory against the 
injustice of terra nullius while at the same time retaining the spoils of the unjust 
foundation by way of the continued and uncompensated occupation of First 
Nation peoples’ unceded territories’ (Watson 2014, p. 510). But this was a 
‘declarative’ overturning and was just as fictitious as the original fiction because 
like its predecessor, its work was to operate to further conceal the foundational 
sovereign debts of colonialism underpinning Australia’s successful economy 
(Giannacopoulos, 2017). The legal order does the work of making theft 





is settler colonialism’s specific irreducible element’ (2006, p. 388). The 
foregrounding of the landmark Mabo case here is to make a new claim about 
it. The act of revisiting colonial foundations triggered by the claims made by 
Eddie Mabo and his people, the landmark judgment has birthed and instituted 
another legal foundation, one that began in 1992 and one that further cements 
structures of invasion. As such it has nomophilically worked to conceal 
Australia’s sovereign debt and has provided a fresh foundation for subsequent 
legal events designed to efface colonial violence and cement colonial power.   
Where Watson’s vast body of work asserts that the endurance of terra nullius 
has been genocidal, Patrick Wolfe’s work makes a critical distinction between 
genocide and what he terms the ‘logic of elimination’ (Wolfe 2006, p. 387). 
Extending the work of Wolfe helps to elucidate the ways in which Australian 
law, in particular the Constitution offers a legal form for invasion to be made 
permanent and a vehicle for colonial power to operate invisibly. Even though 
it could be argued that the ‘logic of elimination’ has manifested as genocidal, 
Wolfe contends that the two should be distinguished because elimination 
performs two interrelated tasks. In its negative sense, it works to dissolve native 
societies since the principal motive for elimination is not race but access to 
territory. Having accessed this territory, ‘positively, it erects a new colonial 
society on the expropriated land base’ signifying the permanence of the 
coloniser’s intentions (Wolfe 2006, p. 388). In the Australian context the 
positive/negative dimensions of elimination manifest where: 
the erasure of indigeneity conflicts with the assertion of settler nationalism. On 
the one hand, settler society required the practical elimination of the natives in 
order to establish itself on their territory. On the symbolic level, however, settler 
society subsequently sought to recuperate indigeneity in order to express its 
difference—and accordingly, its independence—from the mother country (Wolfe 
2006, p. 389). 
In Wolfe’s critical distinction between genocide and elimination as the logic of 
Australian settler colonialism is the insight that inclusion is an integral 
component of elimination. To be included in the colonial construct that is 
Australia, is the meaning and logic of elimination. This form of colonial power 
operates on the basis that Indigenous peoples have survived genocide. This 
survival then, presents opportunities for their inclusion within Australia without 
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the coloniser surrendering the seized territory. Such inclusion operates to 
severely restrict or to eliminate the possibilities for Indigenous peoples to access 
and control their own territory. As Wolfe contends ‘settler colonialism destroys 
to replace’ (2006, p. 388) and by attempting the destruction of Indigenous 
laws, a space is cleared for colonial law to impose itself as singular. Colonial 
law and society then can tolerate the survival of Aboriginal peoples but not of 
their laws and their status as sovereign peoples. In line with this, the quest for 
consent, through legal events that foundationally cement colonial legal borders 
are a major technology for elimination. The Constitutional Recognise Campaign 
(2012-2017) has been such an event. The Recognise Campaign was firmly 
implicated in the project of gaining consent for law’s violence, but it had 
precedents in earlier legal events; events that are continually producing and 
reproducing the colonial structures of ‘invasion’ as Wolfe has named it. In other 
words, colonial law operates to eliminate through inclusion within the borders 
of colonial law. This is achieved via the law’s key moments or events around 
race relations or around the question of the continued existence and status of 
Indigenous peoples in colonial society. 
Up until 1967 Indigenous peoples in Australia were not deemed to be human 
at all and as a result of Aboriginal politicisation that was according to Gary 
Foley conservative in approach, the national referendum was held (2010). The 
result of this referendum was that from one extreme of being denied humanity, 
Indigenous peoples were now designated citizens of ‘Australia’. By fact of 
inclusion, their exclusion could once again be ensured. But as Gary Foley has 
argued the Indigenous activism that resulted in the 1967 referendum was 
conservative and after the exodus of Indigenous peoples from rural areas to 
Redfern in the 1960s new forms of Indigenous activism were deemed necessary 
to redress questions of deep and foundational injustice of Indigenous people 
who survived but were expected to accept political and legal death. New forms 
of activism emerged, these were the founding of a ‘black power movement’, 
the founding of the Aboriginal tent embassy and calls for Indigenous 
sovereignty and self-determination (2010). In light of this, there is a 
fundamental error in turning to the Constitution seeking remedy for ongoing 
attempts at genocide and dispossession. The constitutional nomopoly cements 





territory. While Patrick Wolfe famously argued that invasion is ‘a structure and 
not an event’, I am building here on a lesser-known but related aspect of his 
work that invasion is ‘constituted through events, through practices that 
colonisers repeatedly strive to maintain’ (Wolfe 2016, p. 36). Here I emphasise 
constitutional legal events to show the centrality of structures of law in 
cementing invasion. These do not readily appear violent because the imposed 
nomopoly produces the fictitious knowledge that law in the Australian context 
is legitimate, singular and without rival. This is nomophilia and it runs through 
a series of legal events that are presented (and often understood) as an 
antidote to the coloniality of law. Stemming from this is a blind love and faith 
in the correctness of colonial law. This is both product and contemporary device 
of the nomopoly. 
The Australian Debtscape 
Australia's sovereign debt crisis is still not formally acknowledged, but proof of 
it can be found in the Deathscapes archives where the state is revealed to 
ritually enact violence sanctioned by law at the borders that law has produced. 
Law is deeply implicated in providing the conditions underwriting prosperity for 
mining interests for example even at a time when the country is in the grips of 
apocalyptic fires and environmental damage caused by the unwillingness of 
the colonial state to accept Indigenous law and knowledge (Odisha 2019). The 
debtscape is the place where foundational harms of colonialism are continued 
in the present day and are legitimised through legal apparatuses. Law is the 
location where the evidence of state violence is quashed lest it reveal the 
violence upon which its legal apparatuses are founded. Debtscapes are the 
border zones and practices emanating from Australia’s hidden and unpaid 
sovereign debt to Aboriginal peoples where austerity has always been an 
aspect of colonial rule. To address the deaths resulting from these state 
practices, sovereign debt must become visible. The Australian debtscape is the 
place that has never owned up to its indebtedness and the place that still shows 
no sign of willingness to pay for the debts that all its social, political and legal 
systems and associated privileges are premised upon. There also does not seem 
to be any immediate plan to consider how this foundational debt, incurred 
through frontier violence, dispossessing land removals and the imposition of a 
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British legal and political order, can stop accruing. Mabo, the case celebrated 
for bringing Australia’s legal system in line with human rights norms, in fact 
further buried the sovereign debt owed. When the High Court held that the 
nature of sovereignty held by the colonial state could not be questioned 
because it would fracture the skeletal principle upon which the law is premised, 
law was constructing the border around how law should be understood. And 
it seems to work. Many legal scholars and law advocates follow the lead of 
the state and work to support the closing of borders on the question of 
sovereign debt. This is despite the ample evidence of colonial violence in the 
public realm. It is also despite the existence of the well-established (colonial) 
legal tenet, that knowing of harm or violence and turning away from it is to 
give consent for it to continue.  
In Australia, as in many other settler colonial countries globally, it is law, or 
rather a particular type of legal system that imposes a colonial infrastructure 
over stolen territories. This imposition of law is a form of violence but does not 
appear as such because law is generally understood as the antithesis of 
violence. Across the body of my work I have argued that it is the machinery of 
the law that performs a foundational and violent role in dispossession and in 
ensuring the ongoing operations of colonial power. It is a colonial trick to see 
law as the innocent, impartial and objective regime that it attempts to represent 
itself as. To fall for this logic would mean being embroiled consciously or 
unconsciously in nomophilia.  
This belief in, or insistence on, the correctness of colonial law prevents the 
seeing of that regime as a system predicated on mass theft and violence against 
peoples and lands. The immeasurable sovereign debt incurred as a 
consequence of the theft of land, natural resources and more from the First 
Peoples of the land continues to be actively effaced by governments, 
corporations, privileged populations as well as by many knowledge producers. 
Australia can be said to have a sovereign debt at several levels with austerity 
for Indigenous peoples being a key colonial technology. While the colonial 
state made itself and extended its reach off the back of dispossession, First 
Nations Peoples were made poor by being removed from their own bountiful 
lands from where life sustaining resources could be accessed and from where 





Across three interconnected moves, this article has argued that the Australian 
Constitution is a colonial nomopoly because it provides the structure for 
exploitative coloniality to persist in the present while erasing its foundationally 
violent origins, its dismissal of Indigenous law and its ongoing accrual of debt 
in the Australian debtscape. It has identified the archives where evidence of 
state violence exists and has argued that law apparatuses and its agents work 
to erase that violence. Finally, the place where that violence is obfuscated and 
the conditions for it to continue affirmed, is the debtscape. While the outcome 
of the current charges against Constable Zachary Rolfe, the police officer who 
shot and killed Kumanjayi Walker is yet unknown, the broader evidence on 
state violence is abundant and it is clear. When it comes to Indigenous peoples, 
Australian law and policing do not deal with crises—they both produce and are 
the crisis (Giannacopoulos 2019). I am aware that some will find this conclusion 
extreme and may seek solace in the comforting fiction that law is about peace 
and policing about safety. But the evidence of the bloodshed created by state 
violence and housed within the Deathscapes site, among other places, reveals 
exactly what is at stake and what will follow by continuing to turn to colonial 
law for resolutions to colonial violence. 
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